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Summary
The adoption of NATO’s new strategic concept marks the beginning of a new era for the alliance. 
The new concept, and the debates leading up to it, reflects different positions and practices among 
member states both concerning what NATO’s key tasks should be and how relational structures 
inside and outside the alliance should be organised. Against this backdrop, this policy paper 
examines the timely question of whether NATO is developing into a security organisation ”à la 
carte”, engaging in security tasks on a case-by-case basis and alternately serving the interests of 
different member states, constellations and external partners. We observe that both in terms of 
tasks and relationships, NATO and its member states are faced with challenges that in the long 
run could lead to increased internal fragmentation as well as à la carte solutions. First, when 
it comes to tasks, the debate on whether NATO should return to its traditional responsibilities 
and core areas or focus more on its evolving global role is likely to continue. Second, when 
it comes to relationships, cluster formations, bilateralism and ad hoc coalitions of the willing 
challenge the unity within NATO. At the same time, significant external partners, among them 
Russia, often challenge it from the outside. Actors like the EU and the United States, who operate 
partly within and partly outside NATO, complicate relational structures further. For Norway, an 
increased tendency of à la carte solutions in NATO could raise challenges. Above all, Norway’s 
geopolitical location and status as a non-EU member make the country particularly reliant on a 
well-functioning and unified NATO, committed to its traditional defence tasks as formulated in 
NATO’s Article 5.
The research behind this policy paper has been financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence through 
the project “Towards NATO à la carte: NATO’s adaptation to new tasks and changing relations in a multi-
polar world” (2010). We would like to thank NUPI intern Martina Scapin for her research assistance at 
the start-up of this project and Jan Risvik for careful proof reading. The viewpoints expressed are those 
of the authors. The usual disclaimers apply.
Towards a NATO à la Carte?
Assessing the alliance’s adaptation to 
new tasks and changing relationships
1. Introduction 
At the summit in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010, NATO adopted a 
new strategic concept. In the eleven years separating the new strategic 
concept (2010) and the previous one (1999), NATO has gone through 
one of the most challenging periods in its history and had to adapt to a 
new situation (Aybet & Moore 2010; NATO Group of Experts 2010). 
New security challenges and changing relational structures inside and 
outside the alliance have put the unity of NATO under pressure.  
 
In this policy paper, we ask whether NATO is turning into a security 
organisation à la carte, engaging in security tasks on a case-by-case 
basis and alternately serving the interests of different member states, 
constellations and external partners. We observe that both in terms of 
its tasks and relationships, NATO has gone through changes in rheto-
ric and action that alter its traditional role. On the basis of our discus-
sion, we note that further development towards NATO à la carte could 
have several implications for the alliance in the coming years. First, 
increased use of à la carte solutions could very well enhance NATO’s 
efficiency as a security organisation, allowing flexibility among mem-
ber states both in terms of tasks and internal and external cooperation 
structures. At the same time, however, a flexible ”menu” could also 
increase the need for coalition building and alliance making inside 
NATO, putting increased pressure on already scarce diplomatic and 
political resources. In the long run, a NATO à la carte that reflects 
long-term internal incoherence concerning future role and functions 
could mean the end of NATO as a mature, value-based security com-
munity. Finally, to small and medium sized member states, a NATO à 
la carte where every member could choose from a menu of coopera-
tion activities according to its own security needs, could be particu-
larly challenging. Many of these countries depend on the “automatic” 
provision of security as specified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. This includes Norway, where allied assistance in the case of 
military pressures or an armed attack constitutes the backbone of its 
security policy. 
 
Sticking to our dining metaphor, the remainder of this policy paper is 
structured as follows: Section two offers a brief overview of NATO’s 
new security environment. In section three, we define the à la carte 
metaphor and explore indications of such a development. At the level 
of tasks, a key question is whether NATO should retain a set menu or 
open for increased use of à la carte solutions. At the level of internal 
relations, we observe that tendencies of sub-grouping, cluster forma-
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tion and bilateralism around NATO’s “dinner table” challenge its abil-
ity to perform collectively. When it comes to NATO’s external rela-
tions, we look at the tendency of NATO countries to establish individ-
ual relations with guests at adjacent tables at NATO’s ”dinner party” 
or guests standing at the gate. The fourth section explores how the ten-
sion between these different future paths comes to expression in 
NATO’s new strategic concept, and the fifth section offers some re-
flections on the implications of a NATO à la carte for Norway’s secu-
rity and defence politics. We conclude with some thoughts concerning 
the way ahead for NATO. 
2. A changing security environment 
for NATO 
When NATO adopted its previous strategic concept in 1999, the Kos-
ovo war was still ongoing and NATO had only just begun its process 
of eastern enlargement. Both the war and enlargement challenged 
NATO’s already strained relations with Russia. Reflective of this se-
curity landscape, the strategic concept adopted in Washington in April 
1999 made it clear that the alliance was to extend the scope of tasks on 
its operational “menu”, and operate not only in its core area but also 
”out of area” (NATO 1999).  
 
Since then, other landmark events have challenged NATO’s role fur-
ther. The most important ones include 11 September 2001 and the 
Bush administration’s launch of the “war on terror”, the interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the terrorist attacks on Madrid and London, 
the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the international financial 
crisis, and the emergence of new global powers. In the past years, we 
have also witnessed the emergence of new great powers and the return 
of certain old ones. NATO’s strategic environment has become multi-
polar, thus increasingly demanding a multi-dimensional response 
(Akker & Rühle 2007). In this environment, new influential players 
look for ways of impacting on the security architecture both in Europe 
and in a broader international context. In 2008, Russia proposed a 
new, binding security treaty for Europe, which is a good illustration of 
this trend. If implemented, this security system would replace the 
OSCE and NATO (Monaghan 2008).  
 
In an increasingly multi-polar world where the relative power balance 
is shifting, Western countries could benefit from uniting forces to bal-
ance or step up to the new powerful actors. Here, NATO undoubtedly 
has a potential to play a key role. Increased political will behind it 
could make the alliance better prepared to meet the global challenges 
in a situation where the alliance itself has decided to go out of area 
and has therefore had to interact with an increasing number of actors. 
In addition, the members of the alliance presume that instability and 
conflicts beyond NATO’s borders may threaten the security of the 
core area by fostering extremism, terrorism or transnational illegal ac-
tivities. This means that what NATO does for the rest of the world – 
its global engagement – is likely to remain important also if the alli-
ance were to return to its traditional ”core tasks”, as signalled in the 
new strategic concept. Hence, the changing international security en-
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vironment may result not only in NATO redefining its relations with 
key actors outside of the alliance, but also the way of doing business 
within NATO. 
 
Parallel to the changes in its security environment, NATO has also 
changed as an organisation. Twelve new member states have joined 
the alliance since the end of the Cold War. These countries have 
brought new perceptions and concerns into the alliance, changing 
NATO’s organisational culture, and sometimes putting strains on both 
the inner life of the alliance and its relations with key external partners 
like Russia. At the same time, the fact that NATO now covers nearly 
all non-neutral or non-aligned countries in Europe1 has also empow-
ered the alliance, strengthening the likelihood of NATO remaining a 
key forum for transatlantic security cooperation and dialogue. 
 
                                                 
1  With the exception of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia/ 
FYROM, Kosovo and Serbia which do not want to join the alliance or do not yet meet the 
membership criteria 
3. Towards a NATO à la carte? 
NATO has often been described as a unique, value-based Euro-
Atlantic security community. In Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s 
definition, a security community is a group of states within which a 
large-scale use of violence is unthinkable due to the strong sense of 
collective identification and established structures for cooperation. 
NATO can best be described as a mature pluralistic security commu-
nity with collective security mechanisms and some supranational or 
transnational elements (Adler & Barnett 1998). Its security is indivisi-
ble and has to be defended on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose 
and fair burden sharing. Increased tendencies towards à la carte solu-
tions, we argue, challenge the unity of the transatlantic security com-
munity. 
 
The idea of a “multi-tier NATO” or NATO à la carte is not new. Ac-
cording to this view, to avoid further disintegration, a NATO à la carte 
or as an alliance guided by the principle of ”variable geometry” 
should be introduced (Schreer & Noetzel 2009; Dörfer 1986). In such 
a NATO, consensus is no longer an absolute demand. Countries may 
engage in closer cooperation if they so wish, unless it conflicts with 
NATO objectives or decisions or established practices. The à la carte 
model is precisely reflecting an organisation where the members par-
ticipate according to their own interests and abilities or resources. 
Such à la carte or ”variable geometry” solutions have been proposed 
in response to the institutional challenges of the EU following enlarge-
ment. Other models that have been put forward to reduce intra-
organisational pressures or incoherence include ”multi-speed Europe” 
or ”two-speed Europe”, where all EU countries were expected to 
reach the same level of integration but with different speeds, that is, at 
different points in time. Instead the EU chose an ”opt-out” model 
where EU members unwilling or unable to participate in new areas of 
EU cooperation may opt out from these articles in the treaties and the 
common decisions made under them. For instance, Denmark and Brit-
ain and the non-aligned and neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Swe-
den) do not participate in the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP, formerly ESDP), and some of these opted out from the 
Euro, too (Denmark, Britain, Sweden). But the à la carte model has 
also been used to describe individual countries’ foreign policy. For 
example, the Bush administration’s choice of coalitions of the willing 
in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and unilateralist approach to 
the International Criminal Court and climate issues have been referred 
to as a form of ”multilateralism à la carte” (Foot et al. 2003). 
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3.1 New tasks on NATO’s menu: set menu or selection à la 
carte?  
The new strategic concept has been presented as an ”action plan” and 
stresses NATO’s role as an agenda setter. The concept assesses the 
current security environment and outlines key tasks, challenges and 
priorities for the alliance in the coming years and also summarises 
NATO’s experiences and lessons learned from the last decade. The 
concept echoes the collective commitment to safeguard the territorial 
freedom and security of all member states, as spelled out in Article 5 
of the Treaty. At the same time, it acknowledges that the threat of con-
ventional military attacks against NATO territory is currently low, and 
that new types of security challenges are emerging, among them 
threats related to international terrorism, cyber attacks and energy se-
curity.  
 
In order to achieve its security goals, the alliance will be committed to 
the three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and coop-
erative security (par. 4). How NATO in the end will address these 
challenges and core tasks will depend not only on the alliance’s de-
fence and deterrence potential, but also on other factors. They include 
NATO’s ability to prevent and manage crises beyond its borders, de-
velop a comprehensive approach in dealing with crises and learn from 
its recent operations, especially in the Western Balkans and Afghani-
stan. In addition, its strategic choices in the areas of nuclear disarma-
ment (Andreasen, Chalmers, Williams 2010), arms control and non-
proliferation will have both direct and indirect bearing on the security 
of its members and cooperation with partners.    
 
NATO’s core task has been and remains the collective defence of the 
member states. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the 
question of what should be NATO’s core tasks and long-term purpose 
was high on the agenda in the discussions leading up to the Lisbon 
Summit. Here, different positions and viewpoints persist among the 
member states  (Górka-Winter & Madej 2010). In response to the situ-
ation developing in Afghanistan, many members started voicing con-
cern that the alliance faced a ”strategic overstretch” and that failure in 
that most important out of area mission could have negative impact on 
the future of the alliance as a reliable security provider (Hoehn & 
Harting 2010). This was an especially important question in relation to 
the situation developing in NATO’s own near abroad where Russian 
excessive use of military power in Georgia in 2008 and massive mili-
tary exercises with clear anti-NATO undertones have upset several 
new NATO members as well as old ones. 
 
In view of this, one of the key questions on the agenda for the strate-
gic concept discussions thus was whether NATO should reorient itself 
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in the direction of “Article 5” tasks – i.e. collective defence of the 
NATO member states – or rather aim to develop its new global en-
gagement further. Norway was among the countries pushing for the 
former position and went in 2008 in the forefront of this with its so-
called “near abroad” initiative. Norway was supported by several 
Eastern European and Baltic countries that feared, especially after the 
Georgia war in 2008, that Russia again could pose a threat to their se-
curity. On the other hand, the United States, Britain and Denmark ad-
vocated a stronger global role for NATO (Goldgeier 2010).  
 
Since the probability of a conventional attack against NATO territory 
in Europe is considered low and the naming of concrete countries as a 
source of strategic threat to the alliance would be both unwise and po-
litically incorrect, those advocating NATO’s return to core tasks may 
face a practical problem of how to convince other members that the 
alliance should focus more on Article 5-related challenges. On the 
other hand, the alliance faces several global and asymmetric security 
challenges such as terrorism, cyber attacks, threats related to critical 
infrastructure, thereof to energy security, and new technological 
threats, such as the threat posed by proliferation of various types of 
weapons and technologies of mass destruction, including ballistic mis-
siles. In addition there is a fear that instability and conflicts beyond 
NATO’s borders may threaten the security of the alliance members by 
fostering extremism, terrorism or transnational illegal activities. Ignor-
ing this type of challenges and limiting the alliance’s out of area en-
gagement could therefore have negative consequences for its core 
area. 
 
A good illustration of how remote as well as core area-related security 
challenges are linked together is the issue of the missile defence. Al-
though the missile shield was to provide an additional security to the 
core area against threats stemming from other parts of the globe 
caused by expected proliferation of ballistic missile technology, the 
project was originally met with some scepticism both within the alli-
ance and from key partners such as Russia. The concern was that the 
shield’s realisation would harm their own security interests. However, 
after multiple rounds of discussions and the United States’ decision to 
modify its plans, the alliance decided to develop the shield in close 
cooperation with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.  
 
The fact that NATO officials and members again talk about deterrence 
and core tasks, and not only about NATO’s global role, especially in 
Afghanistan, reflects that the discourse has changed. However, NATO 
will continue to be a global provider of global security, through mod-
ern capacities for crisis management and through its partnerships and 
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partners. The title of the new strategic concept may illustrate this: 
”Active Engagement, Modern Defence”. 
3.2 Changing dynamics around the NATO dinner table: group 
conversation or tête-à-têtes? 
The issue of the missile defence illustrates another important chal-
lenge for NATO, namely the tendency towards fragmentation into bi-, 
tri- and multilateral constellations, groups and camps inside the alli-
ance (Locatelli & Testoni 2010). From the very outset, some member 
states were enthusiastic supporters of the missile defence shield, while 
others voiced concerns of both technical and political character. Some 
member states, among them Poland and the Czech Republic, seemed 
to consider the original plan as a good opportunity to strengthen their 
bilateral security cooperation with the United States. Both the internal 
coalition building and bilateralisation of security cooperation could be 
seen as a challenge to the internal cohesion of the alliance and its abil-
ity to reach collective agreement when faced with grave security chal-
lenges.  
 
A good example of a stable constellation inside NATO is the “Atlanti-
cists,” traditionally made up of member states bordering the Atlantic 
and with strong security ties to the United States. Notable examples 
include Britain, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Canada. In 
recent years, new member countries such as Poland have been added 
to the Atlanticist camp. Other examples of such long-lasting constella-
tions or clubs are “Core Europe” (referring to countries like France, 
Belgium and Germany) and “Club Med” (Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy) (see Græger & Haugevik 2009). 
 
Bi- and trilateral relations among NATO countries also remain impor-
tant. The US-British “special relationship”, encompassing close coop-
eration and information sharing in the fields of security, defence and 
intelligence, is perhaps the best known of these influential bilateral 
partnerships. However, other member states too – among them Nor-
way – have sought to establish and maintain solid bilateral links with 
the United States. France’s return as a full-fledged member of 
NATO’s military structures (for more on the French expectations see 
Maulny 2010) might also strengthen the French-German and British-
French partnerships that have been pivotal in driving the European 
integration process. The French-German coalition has often been re-
ferred to as the “engine” of European integration, whereas bilateral 
French-British initiatives have been crucial in the emergence of a 
European security and defence policy. The recent signing of a historic 
French-British agreement on strategic security and defence coopera-
tion should make this bilateral constellation no less interesting in the 
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years to come (Taylor 2010). On the trilateral side, the so-called 
Weimar Triangle, consisting of Germany, France and Poland, is a no-
table example. The triangle’s stated aim is to strengthen cooperation 
between these three countries “at all levels and in all areas”. 
 
The relational structures of NATO are further complicated by actors 
operating partly on the inside of the alliance and partly outside. The 
EU and the United States (for more on the US perspective see Chivvis 
2009; Cuccia 2010) are probably the foremost examples of this type of 
actors. While the French return to NATO’s structures and the change 
of government in Washington have contributed to improving coopera-
tion between the United States and its European allies in NATO, it 
remains a concern in European capitals that the United States will re-
focus its interests away from Europe – now considered a safe area – 
towards the Pacific area where new challenges are emerging. The 
Obama administration’s reset in its relations with Russia has also 
made some NATO members worry that their security interests could 
be sacrificed on the altar of great power politics and made them con-
sider building new informal coalitions within the alliance (Górka-
Winter & Madej 2010).  
 
The EU, in turn, is both an institutional partner/rival to NATO and an 
actor within it. While as many as 21 countries are members of both 
NATO and the EU, the two organisations have so far had difficulties 
shaping their cooperation in an efficient manner (Vasconcelos et al. 
2010; Græger & Haugevik forthcoming). Despite efforts by both 
NATO and EU leaders, the long-standing Greek-Turkish conflict over 
Cyprus continues to hamper cooperation and dialogue between the 
two organisations. Together with the traditional differences among EU 
member states concerning what security role the EU should play vis-à-
vis NATO, the Cyprus conflict also hinder the EU 21’s surfacing as a 
collective bloc or caucus inside NATO. On the NATO part there is, 
however, an understanding that the EU, viewed as a unique and essen-
tial partner for NATO sharing the same values, plays a positive part in 
shaping the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO also recognises 
the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and 
welcomes the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty strengthening the 
EU’s capacities to address security challenges faced by both organisa-
tions. 
3.3 Extending the dinner party? Adjacent tables and new 
guests at the gate 
Due to its recent global engagement and the way its tasks are defined, 
NATO also has relations with a number of external countries and or-
ganisations. The importance of these partners is evident in the new 
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strategic concept, where the terms ”partner”, ”partners” and ”partner-
ship” are mentioned almost twice as often as in the 1999 version. 
 
NATO’s cooperation with external actors has been an important ele-
ment of the strategy of the alliance since its very inception, not least 
through the policy of open doors that still remains one of the princi-
ples of the alliance. The fact that the number of members of the alli-
ance has increased from the original 12 to the current 28 is the best 
proof of the importance of partnerships in shaping NATO as all the 
new members were at different stages partners of the alliance and 
joined it only after meeting certain formal – and during the Cold War, 
strategic geopolitical – criteria. 
 
The importance of partnerships has increased in the post-Cold War 
setting, especially due to the alliance’s increased global engagement. 
The alliance has had to relate to different and a growing number of 
actors. The cooperation with them has been organised within formal-
ised and non-formalised settings. Relations with some of these coun-
tries, such as Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, are based on special bilat-
eral arrangements. The most important formal arenas for NATO’s co-
operation with other countries have, however, been multilateral ar-
rangements, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC including all NATO members and 22 partner coun-
tries). NATO is also engaged in the Mediterranean Dialogue frame-
work (with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (with Bahrain, Qatar, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates). In addition, NATO maintains 
close informal cooperation with five contact countries, Australia, Ja-
pan, South Korea, New Zealand and the only recently added Pakistan. 
 
NATO’s relations with external actors are based on the principle of 
reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect, and are organised to 
help NATO and partners address challenges such as the fight against 
terrorism, building of democratic environment, modernisation of 
armed forces or sharing of expertise. The alliance has also embarked 
on practical cooperation with external partners on issues like defence 
policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, 
organisation of air defence, communications and information systems, 
crisis management, and civil emergency planning. These partnerships 
are also to help extend the zone of security in the Euro-Atlantic area 
and beyond. Some of the partner countries share their expertise with 
NATO and contribute capabilities to its activities, for instance by sup-
porting NATO operations in Afghanistan. 
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The alliance’s partnership with Russia is in a category of its own, 
which is illustrated by the fact that Russia is mentioned nine times in 
the new strategic concept. Russia is, of course, the successor state of 
the Soviet Union, which was a key reason for NATO’s formation in 
1949. Russia is also a major European power with global interests and 
ambitions that partly overlap, partly are in conflict with those of 
NATO. In Russia, both the elites and large sections of society look at 
NATO with certain, if decreasing, suspicion (Krastev, Leonard & 
Wilson 2009). The Russian military doctrine of February 2010 de-
scribes NATO as an instrument for American policy and a security 
challenge. The Russian expert community, on the other hand, openly 
claims that NATO has clearly outlived itself, that the alliance has no 
new goals on the horizon, that it has not become the world’s police 
officer, and that its only remaining problem in Europe is unsettled re-
lations with Russia (Lukyanov 2010). In response to this perception, 
NATO’s new strategic concept explicitly states that ”NATO poses no 
military threat to Russia”, but instead wishes to develop a true strate-
gic partnership with it.  
 
This, however, does not change the fact that Russia is still seen by 
many, especially new NATO members, as a potential security policy 
challenge because it has a democratic deficit and has demonstrated 
both willingness and ability to use military force to solve its problems 
(two wars in Chechnya and the war with Georgia). Many of those new 
NATO members – but also some old – have chosen NATO member-
ship as a guarantee against an unstable and unpredictable Russia. Al-
though Russia has gone through a difficult transformation, the country 
has not yet been able – or willing – to build a political system based 
on liberal Western values shared by the NATO members and making 
a military conflict between them normatively impossible.  
 
Yet, Russia and NATO also share many common challenges and in-
terests. This was probably an important reason why Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev decided to attend the Lisbon Summit and the ques-
tion of closer cooperation between those two is widely discussed, with 
some even advocating to offer Russia a full-fledged membership in 
the alliance (Kupchan 2010; Lukyanov 2010; ICD-INSOR & IISS 
2010). NATO and Russia have been working on a common threat as-
sessment and the new strategic concept says that they are to cooperate 
closely on a number of security-related issues, such as missile de-
fence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the 
promotion of wider international security. Both Russia and NATO 
seem also to be interested in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan. In 
Lisbon, NATO reached an agreement with Russia allowing the alli-
ance to transport equipment to and from Afghanistan through Russian 
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territory. Medvedev also signalled that the country would cooperate 
with NATO in the development of a joint missile defence.  
 
An alliance encompassing the United States, the sole remaining su-
perpower, as a member is arguably bound to be an important factor in 
the global system. In addition, NATO is itself an important multilat-
eral actor in the global institutional landscape, building partnerships 
with both individual countries and other international organisations. 
The new strategic concept reflects the alliance’s interest in cooperat-
ing with the UN and the EU. At the same time, and unlike the 1999 
version, the new concept does not mention the OSCE at all. The prac-
tical implications of this omission remain to be seen, but to the extent 
that it is interpreted as a political downgrading of the OSCE, it could 
have a negative impact on relations between the two. 
 
4. Strategic concept 2010: more food 
for thought?  
A changing international environment and inner challenges compelled 
the alliance to present a new and sober assessment of the situation and 
to outline the potential tasks faced by NATO in the next decade 
(Goldgeier 2009, Alcarro 2010). The new strategic concept adopted in 
Lisbon on 19 November 2010 (NATO 2010), a relatively short, 4000-
word document, is a clear statement on these challenges and tasks and 
ways of addressing them. In the preface to the strategic concept, the 
heads of state and government reconfirm their commitment to the alli-
ance and its importance in today’s turbulent world. In the second part, 
they outline the core tasks and principles of the alliance, followed by a 
concise though realistic description of the alliance’s security environ-
ment. The new concept was presented as historic and as a clear mani-
festation of NATO’s willingness and ability to adapt to new strategic 
circumstances. At the same time it signalled, however, the return to 
traditional tasks of the alliance. 
 
According to the first reading, the good old NATO is to be ”filled” 
with new content and transformed into something qualitatively new. 
The new Emerging Security Challenges Division in the NATO HQ2 
that is to deal with such non-traditional security threats as cyber war 
or energy security may exemplify this new approach (ISIS Europe 
2010). On the other hand, the new concept signals NATO’s willing-
ness to breathe new life into its old, traditional role, with a renewed 
focus on the core area and core tasks. This probably also reflects the 
alliance’s acknowledgment of strategic overstretch (e.g. in the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan) and how these and other constraints have im-
pacted on NATO’s ability to address core security concerns of its 
members. In spite of the fact that the new strategic concept seems to 
be pouring both new and old wine into NATO’s bottles, it will hardly 
put an end to discussions about NATO’s purpose but rather open a 
new chapter in this debate.  
 
The strategic concept also provides some clues on the alliance’s open 
door policy, which will remain one of the cornerstones of the alliance 
as the best way of improving security in the Euro-Atlantic area (par. 
27). As many as eight paragraphs (par. 28–35) are devoted to the dis-
cussion of the role of partnerships in the alliance’s policy, with a focus 
                                                 
2   http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_65107.htm?selectedLocale=en 
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on NATO relations with the United Nations, the European Union and 
with Russia.  
 
In the last three paragraphs of the concept document (36–38), the 
heads of state and government underline their determination to con-
tinue to reform and renew NATO, which they describe as the globe’s 
most successful political-military alliance. This is the result, they ar-
gue, of common values such as individual liberty, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law. The purpose of the alliance as outlined in 
the last paragraph of the strategic concept is to ”safeguard the freedom 
and security of its members” and in order to achieve this goal the 
members are to defend these values through unity, solidarity, strength 
and resolve.  
 
To achieve those goals, the alliance will need not only sufficient fi-
nancial, military and human resources (par. 37) but should also use 
those resources in the most efficient and effective way. The new stra-
tegic concept underlines that preserving and strengthening the com-
mon capabilities, standards, structures and funding will remain one of 
the alliance’s priorities. In addition, it also calls for the alliance to ”en-
gage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, im-
prove working methods and maximise efficiency”. The goal of streng-
thening common capabilities, standards and structures could be inter-
preted as a move towards increasing standardisation of the alliance. 
This would narrow the possibility for members to cooperate on a case 
to case basis like in coalitions of the willing. By implication, imposed 
common standards could be seen as a reversal or weakening of the 
trend towards a NATO à la carte principle.  
 
However, in an organisation with 28 members and even more coope-
ration partners, a standardised response to all conceivable situations 
may cause conflicts and serious challenges. To respond effectively, 
NATO will have to act in a flexible manner and adapt to new chang-
ing environments. The newly adopted strategic concept may solve cer-
tain issues, but many others remain open. Addressing them will re-
quire more discussion and action and here the new concept gives some 
answers but also brings new questions to the table.  
 
Finally, the adoption of NATO’s new strategic concept could in some 
respects be seen as marking a formal end to the alliance’s long period 
of reflection on its recent past. The concept gives no final conclusion 
as to what role NATO should play in the years to come. On the con-
trary, it is rather laconic in addressing this particular issue. New de-
bates about how the concept is to be interpreted, specified and trans-
lated into political action are all the more likely.  
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Differing views within the alliance on what tasks NATO should take 
on and how it should organise its internal and external relational struc-
tures to address them could in the longer run promote a NATO à la 
carte. For the smaller member states, like Norway, the practical impli-
cation might be an even greater need for coalition building and diplo-
matic efforts than is the case today.  
5. What are the implications for Nor-
way in NATO? 
For Norway, a NATO à la carte is likely to imply challenges and diffi-
culties, and possibly fewer opportunities. Norway is one of NATO’s 
founders and NATO membership has been a cornerstone of Norwe-
gian security and defence policy since 1949. Being a loyal ally to the 
United States in particular, Norway is an insider in NATO. Norway’s 
close bilateral relationship with the United States during the Cold War 
period and in the first three years of the ”global war on terror” in par-
ticular, also contributed to ensuring the Norwegian position as an in-
sider in the alliance (Græger 2007). There are at least two key reasons 
for Norway’s interest in NATO. The first is that Norway is not a 
member of the EU, although in many ways a de facto member in eco-
nomic and some other policy areas (through the Schengen and the 
EEA agreement). Norway is, however, an ”outsider” when it comes to 
the EU dimension of European security, despite its participation in the 
ESDP and EU-led operations. Norway has no access to the political 
discussions in various EU fora discussing security and defence, for 
instance prior to NATO summits and ministerial meetings. The evolu-
tion of the EU’s foreign and security policy caused by the implemen-
tation of the Lisbon Treaty results in Norway having even less influ-
ence on the EU decision and policy making in that area. At the same 
time, the Berlin Plus framework, which is the only formal security co-
operation involving both EU and non-EU NATO countries, has been 
in a stalemate for a long time, because of the Cyprus issue. This has 
reduced the relevance of Berlin Plus as a channel for accessing EU 
policy and strategic thinking for Norway, too (see Græger 2007b).  
 
All of this may not be a serious challenge today, when NATO seems 
to be in good shape and President Barack Obama claims that he values 
NATO as an arena for consultation with allies in security matters. 
However, if the United States is re-investing in NATO, it probably 
means that it is also re-investing in other alliances and relations that 
are perhaps viewed as even more important for US global interests. 
For instance, the bilateral relations between the United States and the 
EU are in the making, and at least American think tanks regard the 
prospects for closer cooperation as high (Hamilton et al. 2009). 
Changes in international relational structures in which the EU plays a 
part and especially in EU–US relations may also affect NATO’s role 
and influence in European security. Arguably, a stronger bilateral EU–
US relationship may also potentially reduce non-EU members’ influ-
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ence, because issues of relevance to European or transatlantic security 
might be sorted out before they reach NATO. As EU membership is 
currently not on the political agenda in the Norwegian domestic politi-
cal debate, Norway’s formal association with the EU is likely to re-
main unchanged in the foreseeable future. 
 
A second reason why Norway has become one of the strongest advo-
cates of NATO’s return to its core tasks is the emerging international 
order and the changing distribution of power influencing also Nor-
way’s strategic environment. The decision to become a NATO mem-
ber in 1949 was caused by the reading of the strategic situation devel-
oping around Norway. The emerging multipolar world and especially 
Russia’s return to the international scene seem to have re-activated a 
similar reading of Norway’s strategic situation, at least in Norway (see 
e.g. Ministry of Defence 2007-08; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008-
2009; Godzimirski 2010; Græger 2011). Russia is an important, re-
turning great power in this new order. NATO’s future role and func-
tion are of key importance to Norway’s security and action space 
within security matters – as a subject and not only as an object in the 
international power game. Norway’s place on the Russian strategic 
radar screen and strategic position vis-à-vis Russia are likely to remain 
a function of Norway’s connection to Western security institutions, 
and especially to NATO, in the years to come. The tighter the link be-
tween Norway and these institutions, the more disinclination Russia is 
likely to show when Norwegian interests in areas of potential conflict 
or tension are challenged.  
 
Norway’s proximity to Russia is no longer seen as a security threat but 
may pose some security challenges, mainly due to the lack of demo-
cratisation and differences in the demographic, economic and military 
potentials of the two countries. Norway’s expressed concern that 
NATO has forgotten its ”near abroad” is a reflection of this reading of 
the situation. Hence, ability to retain a sufficient deterrence potential 
will also be a key to ensuring good relations with Russia. In the 
NATO debates about the strategic concept, Norwegian government 
representatives apparently managed to build an intra-alliance coalition 
that was strong enough to imprint the concept and push its views 
through the NATO decision-making machinery. The fact that the con-
cept (in the first paragraphs) focuses on issues vital to Norway’s inter-
ests is hopefully going to have a positive impact on the country’s se-
curity situation as well as its position within the alliance.   
 
Precisely due to its long-standing experience with Russia as a neigh-
bour, Norway can possibly also act as an enabler in improving the al-
liance’s relationship with its most important neighbour in the east. 
However, this role also depends on Russia’s future development and 
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Russian-NATO/Western relations at the international level. Norway 
belongs to a category of small states, which Russia sees as objects 
rather than subjects of international relations. In Russian thinking, a 
re-establishment of the European concert of powers would give Russia 
– together with its strategic partners such as France and Germany 
(Leonard & Popescu 2007) – a decisive say over European security 
issues. In such a system, American influence in Europe could be 
curbed (Shapiro & Witney 2009; Naumann 2009), and so would the 
influence of the NATO members, whose future would be decided not 
within the multilateral, but rather within a new multipolar framework.  
 
A possible closer cooperation between the EU and Russia, between 
Russia and NATO and between EU and NATO will definitely in-
crease stability and predictability in Norway’s strategic environment 
and should therefore be seen as a positive development. Increased co-
operation between the EU and NATO and especially between Russia 
and NATO may make it easier for Norway to share its special and 
mostly positive experience from cooperation with Russia with other 
alliance members who are more sceptical towards Russia. Changing 
the negative attitudes towards Russia within the alliance could in itself 
also have a beneficial impact on the overall security situation in 
Europe. It could also improve the alliance’s internal coherence by re-
moving one of the current intra-alliance bones of contention, i.e. dif-
ferent views on possible closer cooperation with Russia. This could 
also promote a standardised and unified NATO approach towards 
Russia, facilitating an efficient and coherent policy towards Russia. 
Consequently, Russia’s scepticism towards the alliance may appear as 
less founded, preventing Russia from strengthening bilateral relations 
with some core powers (Germany and France).  
 
Finally, how will a possible development towards a NATO à la carte 
affect NATO’s ability to remain the main provider of security for 
Norway in the current international order? According to some ana-
lysts, the Scandinavian NATO members chose the à la carte model 
from the very beginning, with Norway’s self-imposed restrictions on 
the pre-stocking of certain US military material on Norwegian soil and 
Denmark’s so-called footnote policy in NATO during the Cold War as 
the ultimate examples (Dörfer 1986). Arguably, then, Norway can be 
said to be an experienced à la carte player. However, it should be em-
phasised that this policy took place at a time when security threats 
were less complex and multi-faceted and NATO’s organisation more 
heterogeneous than today. A future NATO à la carte based on ”vari-
able geometry” or ”variable membership” would therefore put more 
strains on its members, demanding an even stronger focus on coalition 
building and diplomacy than is the case today. Not only is this time 
and resource consuming but it could, arguably, reduce Norway’s secu-
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rity policy room of manoeuvre. Indeed, NATO’s role as the primary 
guarantor of the security of its member states is not entirely embodied 
in Article 5 but in its role as a forum for security consultations. Should 
NATO’s role and function in this capacity be diminished as a result of 
shifting groupings (bilateralism, clusters), coalitions and conflicting 
views on vital issues, then so would its relevance as a security organi-
sation. In addition, a NATO à la carte could further emphasise the 
considerable disadvantages of being outside the EU. In relation to 
European security, Norway would be an insider and an outsider at the 
same time.  
6. Conclusion  
The increased tendency of ad hoc coalitions of the willing, national 
caveats on the use of forces in NATO missions and closer bilateral 
and trilateral cooperation inside NATO are among the factors indi-
cating that a two-third NATO or a NATO à la carte is emerging. As 
noted above, conflicts of interest between one or more groups of states 
have manifested themselves and these constellations of states seem to 
play out in increasingly more important issues for NATO. Over time, 
”opt-outs” or reservations from common decisions – be it in the form 
of coalitions of the willing or national caveats – may appear as long-
lasting. This may undermine the transatlantic political community or 
”the unique community of values”, as stated in the strategic concept 
(par. 2), which is the glue of the alliance. Bilateralism, trilateralism, 
issue specific coalitions and controversy over key issues may gener-
ally also reduce the de facto influence of smaller member countries. 
Militarily and technologically superior NATO members may to a 
great degree define, through their operative leadership, the precondi-
tions for missions conducted by a coalition of the willing. Increased 
use of such coalitions may therefore confirm the power of these states. 
Powerful NATO members may also – though this needs to be empiri-
cally ”tested” from case to case – have the upper hand inside clusters, 
and especially in ad hoc coalitions, mainly due to their size and mili-
tary resources. Hence, a development towards a NATO à la carte may 
arguably water out the principle that all members have equal weight in 
alliance decision-making, if not formally, then at least in practice. 
 
The new strategic concept describes NATO as ”the unique and essen-
tial transatlantic forum for consultations” (par. 5). However, this role 
could be weakened should the alliance become a ”force pool” for 
members who wish to make use of NATO’s efficient military machin-
ery, while at the same time bypassing NATO as a consensus organisa-
tion. At least several countries, among them Norway, have warned 
against a NATO that ”develops into a forum that confirms agreement 
reached in other and more closed fora” (Ministry of Defence 2000-01: 
22). Such fora include coalitions of the willing or permanent clusters 
of members inside NATO. In addition, fora outside NATO, such as 
G8 and G20, are becoming increasingly more important in addressing 
regional and global politics and security. 
 
Other important factors that may push the alliance towards developing 
an à la carte strategic culture are: 
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 the impact of the economic crisis resulting in, especially, Euro-
pean budget cuts. This may affect investments in traditional 
security, undermine the principle of fair burden sharing, 
weaken the internal coherence and external unity of the alli-
ance and, in the longer run, its military power;  
 
 lack of a common, existential threat consolidating the alliance 
in the same way as the Soviet threat did during the Cold War;  
 
 the growing realisation that the main engagement of the alli-
ance over the last decade, the fight against international terror-
ism, can only be solved through a combination of military and 
non-military means, revealing that NATO is partly irrelevant;  
 
 diverging interests of alliance members across regions and sec-
tors (specific issue areas), challenging the prospects for intra-
alliance cooperation, consensus-building and coherent partner-
ships with external partners.   
 
Are there, then, no positive aspects of a NATO developing into a se-
curity organization à la carte? To avoid further disintegration and en-
able strategic decision-making, some have voiced that the alliance 
should allow members to select from a menu of cooperation, suggest-
ing that a NATO à la carte might be part of the solution and not only 
part of the problem. Indeed, although common visions and a commu-
nity of values remain vital for NATO’s strength as an organisation, a 
NATO à la carte may actually allow the alliance to act in situations of 
internal political disagreement or stalemate. This may, in turn, ensure 
a place for the alliance on an international arena increasingly domi-
nated by G’s, such as the G8 and G20, emerging great powers (the 
BRICs) but also non-state actors (e.g. private military companies, 
NGOs).  
 
Furthermore, the à la carte model would add a certain flexibility to the 
alliance, ensuring that it remains a practical security tool for the inter-
national community (and for its members). Such an alliance would 
probably also be better prepared to address challenges that do not re-
quire the military force of the entire alliance. For many of NATO’s 
current and potential future members the à la carte option may never-
theless seem less tempting than the partly mythologised automaticity 
inherent in the “one for all and all for one” principle stated in Article 
5. But all current and future members would probably agree that a 
NATO à la carte is preferable to a NATO that is unable to act, because 
of internal rift, over time potentially leading to an alliance in complete 
collapse.  
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